ABSTRACT The Salsa20 stream cipher was designed by Bernstein in 2005 as a candidate for eSTREAM and Salsa20/12 was accepted in the eSTREAM software portfolio in 2008. In this paper, we present an improved related-cipher attack on Salsa20. If a secret key is used in Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8 with 2 different IVs, we can recover the 256-bit secret key with time complexity of about 2 193.58 , which improves the existing attack by a factor of 2 30.42 . To the best of our knowledge, this is the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20 so far. Furthermore, we build a binary integer optimization model to search for the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20. The results show that our attack is the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20 in this model.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Salsa20 stream cipher, proposed by Bernstein [1] , is one of the candidates for eSTREAM [2] project. Salsa20 offers a very simple, clean, and scalable design, and supports 128-bit and 256-bit keys in a very natural way. From a security standpoint Bernstein [3] recommends a 256-bit secret key. Original Salsa has 20 rounds. But later Salsa with 8 rounds (Salsa20/8) and 12 rounds (Salsa20/12) were also proposed by Bernstein [4] . After three evaluation phases, Salsa20/12 was selected into the final portfolio of the eSTREAM Project in 2008.
A. RELATED WORKS
The simplicity and scalability of Salsa20 has given more importance in cryptanalytic area. Since their publication, Salsa20 has undergone significant cryptographic analysis. There are several works that have studied the cryptanalysis of Salsa20 [5] - [15] . The first attack was proposed by Crowley [5] in 2005. He presented an attack on Salsa20/5 with time complexity of 2 165 and is based on truncated differentials. In INDOCRYPT 2006, Fischer et al. [6] constructed a key recovery attack on Salsa20/6 and observe non-randomness after seven rounds. In SASC 2007, Tsnunoo et al. [7] reported a differential cryptanalysis of Salsa20/7 with time complexity of 2 190 . In FSE 2008, Aumasson et al. [8] presented a key recovery attack on Salsa20/8 with estimated time complexity of 2 251 , exploiting first-order differential properties combined with the probabilistic neutral bits (PNB) technique. This attack was improved by Shi et al. [9] in ICISC 2012, which reduced the time complexity to 2 250 . Later, Maitra et al. [10] revisited PNB concept and gave some new ideas to reduce the time complexity up to 2 247.2 on Salsa20/8. After that, Maitra [11] improved the attack complexity up to 2 245.5 . Using multibit approach, Choudhuri and Maitra [12] improved it up to 2 244.9 . Recently, Dey et al. [13] gave a new algorithm to construct Probabilistic Neutral Bits, and further improved it up to 2 243.67 . Besides, in FSE 2008, Hernandez-Castro et al. [15] pointed out some weaknesses in the Salsa20 core function that could be exploited to obtain up to 2 31 collisions for its full (20 rounds) version. They also showed another weakness in the form of a differential characteristic with probability one that proves that the Salsa20 core does not have 2 nd preimage resistance.
Related-cipher attack was first introduced by Wu [16] in 2002. He considered the related ciphers as block ciphers with the same round function, but with different round numbers. If their key schedules do not depend on the total round number, then related-cipher attack could be applied if the same key is used. In [16] , he applied the attack to the block cipher SQUARE and the AES variant. In 2005, Sung et al. [17] applied this attack to the block ciphers ARIA, SC2000, SAFER++, CAST-128 and DEAL. This attack has great affect on protocols, where changing the cipher might introduce weaknesses. As an example of its applications, this kind of attack can be applied to WinZIP's encryption mechanism [17] .
In 2012, Shao et al. [18] first introduced a related-cipher attack on Salsa20. They claimed that if a secret key is used in Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8 to encrypt the same message, the attack can recover the 256-bit secret key with time complexity of about 2 224 .
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we proposed an improved related-cipher attack on Salsa20 by utilizing different IVs. Our attack can recover the 256-bit secret key with time complexity of about 2 193.58 , which improves the existing attack by a factor of 2 30.42 . To the best of our knowledge, this is the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20 so far. Furthermore, we build a binary integer optimization model to search for the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20. The results show that our attack is the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of Salsa20. Our related-cipher attack on Salsa20 is given in Section III. In Section IV we search for the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20. Section V ends the paper with some conclusions.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SALSA20 STREAM CIPHER
A full description of Salsa20 can be found in [1] . Salsa20 is built on a pseudorandom function based on Add-Rotate-XOR (ARX) operations. Hereinafter, bitwise XOR and addition modulo 2 32 are denoted by ⊕ and +, respectively, || indicates concatenation and a t-bit left-shift rotation on a word X is denoted by X ≪ t. The cipher Salsa20 uses the hash function Salsa20 in a counter mode. With a 64-bit initial vector and a 64-bit counter as input, a 512-bit keystream is generated. Salsa20 is a word-oriented stream cipher. Each word is an element of F 2 32 and consists of 32 bits. Firstly, we describe the round function of Salsa20. Given a 4 × 4 word matrix m,
The round function R (m) is defined as follows.
The input and output of function Q are both 4 words, denote by y = y 0 ||y 1 ||y 2 ||y 3 and z = z 0 ||z 1 ||z 2 ||z 3 , respectively.
The Salsa20 encryption function is defined as follows,
Here, H is defined as a ''hash function'' and is calculated as follows.
where k = k 0 ||k 1 || · · · ||k 7 indicates the 256-bit secret key, and v = v 0 ||v 1 indicates the 64-bit initial vector, i = i 0 ||i 1 represents a 64-bit counter, and c = c 0 ||c 1 ||c 2 ||c 3 represents 128-bit constants. When the secret key length is 128 bits, the assignment (
III. IMPROVED RELATED-CIPHER ATTACK ON SALSA20 STREAM CIPHER
Related-cipher attack works on the same principle as slide attacks [19] : by gaining the text produced by the cipher just a few rounds (round m) from the end of the cipher (round n, n > m), the rounds between m and n can be treated as a reduced version of the cipher, which is more easily broken. The salsa20 is a perfect example of this type of cipher, since Salsa20 uses flexible rounds and the key loading process of Salsa20 is independent of the number of rounds. Consider a pair of stream ciphers Salsa20/r and Salsa20/r + r, with different round numbers r and r + r, respectively. If a secret key is used in these two ciphers to encrypt the same message, realted-cipher can be applied on this r-round Salsa20. If r is small, we can recover the secret key of this pair of related ciphers easily. Since there are two reduced-round versions Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8, we apply related-cipher attack on four round Salsa20, which means r = 4, to recover the secret key of Salsa20/12. Now, we will introduce our realted-cipher attack on Salsa20. Our attack aims at recovering the 256-bit secret key of Salsa20/12, given a pair of related ciphers Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8. Let us consider the case that a 256-bit secret key K is used in these two ciphers to encrypt the same message.
Let S 1 and S 2 be the 512-bit keystream generated by Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8, respectively, using the same secret key K . Then we have the following system of two equations:
Since S 1 , S 2 and eight of sixteen cells in m are known to us, while other eight cells contain the key. Then we can straightforwardly infer eight of the sixteen cells in both R 8 (m) and R 12 (m). The above equation is same as 4-round Salsa20 relation between S 1 and S 2 . The details of our attack are described as follows.
If we guess the key words k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 5 , k 6 , k 7 , this allows us to infer these entries of R 8 (m) and R 12 (m) as follows, when S 1 and S 2 are given.
Here, the symbols • and ? indicate known cell and unknown cell to us, respectively.
Applying the round function R to this matrix, we can infer these entries in R 9 (m) as follows. The details of the round function R are described in Appendix A. Now, we will infer the entries of R 10 (m) using R 12 (m). In [5] , Crowley showed that for the inverse of the function Q (denoted Q −1 ), part of the output data does not depend on the input. The function Q −1 is expressed using the equations below.
So, we can infer the inverse of the round function R (denoted R −1 ) using the equation as follows.
where the inverse of the function Q is denoted by Q . The details of the round function R −1 are described in Appendix B.
Recall the entries of R 12 (m) as follows.
Applying the function R −1 to this matrix, we can infer these entries in R 11 (m):
Similarly, we can also infer these entries in R 10 (m) * : However, for the right secret key K , R 10 (m) 12 is equal to R 10 (m) * 12 with probability 1. So, the number of guesses which pass the test is 2 192 ·2 −32 = 2 160 . Furthermore, we can choose different IVs to further reduce the time compleity of our attack. Here, we choose α different IVs. For each IV , we can make the test, which reduces the number of guesses by a factor of 2 32 . Thus, considering the test, we continue our attack with about 2 192−32α out of 2 192 possible guessed values by filtering wrong initial guesses. Later, we guess two more key words k 0 and k 1 . The time complexity for this process is 2 192−32α · 2 64 = 2 256−32α . So, the total time compleity of our attack on Salsa20 is 2 192 · α + 2 256−32α . Let α = 2, the total time compleity of our attack is about 2 193.58 , which is the best result. The complexity of the introduced attack is less than the complexity of an exhaustive search of the key space for more than 194-bit key lengths.
IV. SEARCHING FOR THE BEST RELATED-CIPHER ATTACK ON SALSA20 STREAM CIPHER
Observing the process in Section 3, we can formalze a binary integer optimization model to search for the best relatedcipher attack on Salsa20. For convenience, we define a new notion, called Logistic Conversion, as follows.
Definition 1 (Logistic Conversion): For a word s ∈ F 2 32 , the Logistic Conversion is defined by a mapping VOLUME 7, 2019 f : {known, unknown} → {1, 0} with
Using this Logistic Conversion, we can give new round function denoted by P. Correspondingly, the inverse of the round function P is denoted by P −1 . Take the equation z 1 = y 1 ⊕ ((y 0 + y 3 ) ≪ 7) of the function Q for example. z 1 is known if and only if y 0 , y 1 , y 3 are all known. Then, we can get the equation as follows.
Here, the symbol · denotes general multiplication. When y 0 , y 1 , y 3 , z 1 are all binary integers, the equation above can be denoted by z 1 = y 0 · y 1 · y 3 birefly.
Furthermore, for a 4×4 word matrix m, f (m) is denoted by (f (m i )) (0 ≤ i ≤ 15). Correspondingly, we can consider one word in salsa20 as a binary bit in our binary integer optimization model. That is, the 4 × 4 word matrix m corresponds to a
instead of a 4 × 4 word matrix m in our model. We can also use the functions P and P −1 instead of the functions R and R −1 , respectively. Now, a brief description of the function P is given.
For a vector m = (m 0 , m 1 , · · · , m 15 ) where (m i ∈ {0, 1} , 0 ≤ i ≤ 15), the function P (m) is defined as follows.
The input and output of function S are both 4 bits, denote by u = u 0 ||u 1 ||u 2 ||u 3 and v = v 0 ||v 1 ||v 2 ||v 3 , respectively.
Then, we can describe our binary integer optimization model now. Firstly, we give some notations as follows.
• β : the number of the guessed key words, 0 ≤ β ≤ 8; • δ : the number of the initial words which are both known in R 10 (m) and R 10 (m) * , 0 ≤ δ ≤ 16. Obviously, β should be chosen from 1 to 7 so that our attack is better than exhaustive key search. Getting rid of two null cases resulted from β = 0 and β = 8, we should try other 254 cases in order to get the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20.
According to our model, we give a algorithm called Algorithm 1 which gives a method for search for the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20.
The complexity of Algorithm 1 is clearly close to O (n), where n = 2 l and l denotes the number of 32-bit key words. For Salsa20, l is equal to 8 and n is equal to 256. So, Algorithm 1 can be easily implemented. The results of implementing Algorithm 1 for Salsa20 is given as follows. α denotes the number of different IVs, α ≥ 1.
According to table 1, the results show that the best relatedcipher attack on Salsa20 is not the only one. We can make a related-cipher attack on Salsa20 with time complexity of about 2 193.58 by two approaches. Our attack on Salsa 20 in Section III is one of these two approaches. The other one is to guess the key words k 0 , k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 , k 7 , and then the detailed cryptanalytic process is similar to Section III.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present an improved related-cipher attack on Salsa20. If a secret key is used in Salsa20/12 and Salsa20/8 with 2 different IVs, we can recover the 256-bit secret key with time complexity of about 2 193.58 , which improves the existing attack by a factor of 2 30.42 . Furthermore, we build a binary integer optimization model to search for the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20. The results show that our attack is the best related-cipher attack on Salsa20 in this model.
As a future work, one can try combine with other attacks like differential cryptanalysis to improve our attack. An interesting direction would also be to see whether related-cipher attack can be applied to other stream ciphers or not.
APPENDIX A THE DETAILS OF THE ROUND FUNCTION R
The details of the round function R in the equation 
